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Towards Classical Legal Positivism 
Dan Priel*
Abstract. Open almost any textbook or jurisprudence and you will nd it beginning with a discussion of natural law 
and legal positivism. What sets them apart, we are told, is a di"erence on the conceptual question of the relationship 
between law and morality. Natural lawyers believe that law or legality are necessarily connected to morality, whereas 
legal positivists deny that. In this essay I challenge this fundamental understanding of the debate. &e di"erence 
between legal positivism and natural law has to do with a way inquiries about law should be conducted: natural lawyers 
seek to understand law by relating it to a broader metaphysical picture or a picture of human nature; legal positivist 
begin their inquiry with observations at legal practice. Based on this nding I turn to the work of those philosophers 
nowadays o*en considered the founders of legal positivism, &omas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham. I show that unlike 
contemporary legal positivists they understood their enterprise in ways much closer to those of the natural lawyers, 
only that their metaphysical picture was profoundly di"erently from that of most their natural law contemporaries. 
&is leads to several ndings: that early legal positivists were very di"erent from contemporary legal positivists 
(something that explains why their positivists credentials are questioned these days); that contemporary jurisprudential 
debate between legal positivists and natural lawyers involves, to a great extent, two groups talking past each other; and 
that  contemporary legal positivism is a philosophically uninteresting enterprise. I conclude by suggesting that it is the 
metaphysical version of legal positivism that is more interesting than contemporary legal positivism and that it is this 
version of legal positivism that is worth pursuing.  
I. The Road Not Taken 
When H.L.A. Hart defended legal positivism in his famous Holmes Lecture he sought to do so “as 
part of the history of an idea.”1 In his hands this idea grew out of two philosophical traditions: one 
is utilitarianism while the other is, as he put it, the “important truth that a purely analytical study 
of legal concepts, a study of the meaning of the distinctive vocabulary of the law, was as vital to our 
understanding of the nature of law as historical or sociological studies.”2 Together these two ideas 
led to one “simple but vital distinction” of “law as it is from law as it ought to be.”3  
It is not hard to see that Hart’s juxtaposition of these two ideas is problematic: Bentham, to 
whom Hart ascribes these two ideas, conceived of his utilitarianism as part of an attempt to 
ground the domain of morals and politics on the same foundations and conducted with the same 
rigor as the natural sciences. His empiricism implied that the principles of morals and legislation 
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the annual 
conference of the Australian Society of Legal Philosophy in Brisbane in July 2011. I thank participants there for 
their questions and comments.  
1 See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1958). 
2 Id. at 601. 
3 Id. at 594. 
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had to be based on observation, not conceptual or linguistic analysis. It is true that Bentham 
dedicated many pages to the analysis of language, but all this work was dedicated to exposing the 
extent to which language obscured reality. Legal language in particular came under relentless 
attack, because it was riddled with so many ctions, ambiguities, and mysteries. As such it stood in 
the way of a clear perception of reality, and ultimately in the way of betterment of the human 
condition. As Bentham caustically put it “[a] large portion of the body of the Law was, by the 
bigotry or the artice of Lawyers, locked up in an illegible character, and in a foreign tongue.”4 For 
him, the only path for true understanding of the law came not from attending to the thick foliage 
of legal discourse but rather by cutting through it.5  
Once we see that utilitarianism and linguistic analysis are not natural bedfellows we can turn 
Hart’s claim on its head: there are two distinct ways of defending and understanding legal 
positivism, one is conceptual, the other normative, and they are not easily joined. In Hart’s case it 
did not take long before he abandoned the link between utilitarianism and legal positivism. 
Perhaps he no longer thought it necessary to draw such a link when not facing an audience he 
suspected would not be sympathetic to conceptual inquiry;6 or perhaps Hart simply came to see 
that the two ideas could not be so easily joined.7 Be that as it may, in e Concept of Law, 
published only four years a*er delivering the lecture, legal positivism’s utilitarian connection was 
largely gone. Legal positivism was still presented as a simple idea that (unlike natural law) did not 
require taking on “much metaphysics, which few could now accept,”8 but it was now much more 
4 See JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 21 n.r (1988) (1776). &e ctional nature of 
legal language was a major theme in Bentham’s work, which, he o*en said, was preserved by lawyers for self-
serving reasons. See PHILIP SCHOFIELD, UTILITY AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 111-31 (2007); GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 266-67, 271-
78 (1986).  
5 I am less concerned in this essay with the other gure Hart ascribes these views, John Austin. Austin’s 
interests were more di"erent than Bentham’s than is usually appreciated, and was more interested in clear 
language. But it is worth noting that for all his pedantry over law “properly so called,” Austin did not see himself 
as concerned with elucidating prevalent linguistic usage and he rejected it when it did not t into his scheme. See 
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 26-27 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., 1995). 
6 On Hart’s comments on the di"erence between his approach and that of the Harvard professors and his 
worries about the reception of his lecture see NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND 
THE NOBLE DREAM 195-96 (2004). 
7 See his somewhat di"erent characterization of Bentham’s enterprise in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON 
BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 21-39 (1982); cf. P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL 
REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 256 (1987). 
8 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 188 (2d ed., 1994).  
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the result of conceptual analysis and armchair sociology9 than the conclusion of any ethical or 
metaethical inquiry. As late as in the postscript to e Concept of Law Hart wrote: “I still think 
legal theory should avoid commitment to controversial philosophical theories of the general status 
of moral judgments and should leave open ... the general question of whether they have ... 
‘objective standing’.”10 Knowing Hart’s personal doubts about this very question, there can be 
little doubt that part of the attraction that the conceptual version of legal positivism held for him 
was exactly the fact that unlike other jurisprudential theories he thought that legal positivism did 
not force him to take a stand on questions about which he was personally conZicted.  
It is probably due to the inZuence of e Concept of Law most defenses of legal positivism in 
the last *y years adopted this conceptualist approach. &at none of the other prominent legal 
positivists of the twentieth century was a utilitarian (and, for that matter, that utilitarianism was 
not a very popular view among moral and political philosophers) may have contributed to a 
relative lack of interest in pursuing the question of possible links between positivism and 
utilitarianism. From here it was but a small step to the startling claim made by John Gardner, that 
Bentham’s preference for legislation over the common law—a view that was closely tied to his 
utilitarianism—is “totally independent of his legal positivism.”11 Legal positivism was thus 
stripped by most of its contemporary proponents of the particular historical context in which it 
appeared, of its links to the Enlightenment, of the many ways in which its (alleged) earlier 
proponents tied it to their political thought, and turned into a proposition. It was defended as a 
conceptual truth of “general” jurisprudence, the result of nothing more than careful attention to 
the “study of the meaning of the distinctive vocabulary of the law.”  
But if this proposition were to count as a philosophical thesis, not merely an incontestable 
observational truism, there was a need for a contender. And a contender was duly found; or rather, 
invented and called “natural law.” Now of course, the idea of natural law has provenance going 
back all the way to earliest recorded Western philosophy, but this, historical, natural law is, as 
Peter Gay put it “innitely complex; to draw a map of its growth, its multiple ingredients, its 
changing modes and varied inZuence, would be like drawing a map of the Nile Delta.”12 In this 
9 How these two seemingly di"erent projects connect in Hart is explained in Dan Priel, Jurisprudence 
between Science and the Humanities, 3 WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1566858. 
10 HART, supra note 8, at 253-54. 
11 John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199, 213 (2001).  
12 PETER GAY, THE PARTY OF HUMANITY: ESSAYS IN THE FRENCH ENLIGHTENMENT 199 (1954). For 
detailed surveys see J.B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY 17-166 (1998); KNUD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM 
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vast river one nds discussions on the foundations of political authority, the limits of political 
obligation, the origins of property rights and the justication of contractual obligations, along 
with much else. Little of this was acknowledged in the work of Hart or his followers. In their work 
all this was ignored and an issue that was, at best, a marginal concern in the work of some natural 
law theorists, has been turned into its dening characteristic. In this way a broad-ranging family of 
theories has been bastardized into a proposition to match the proposition that is legal positivism. 
In its simplest form natural law became the proposition that unjust law is not law.13  
&ere was one di^culty with this approach: those who actually called themselves “natural 
lawyers,” those who saw their work as following in the footsteps of earlier natural lawyers, 
dissociated themselves from this proposition. &ey saw no di^culty with accepting the claim that 
there were immoral or unjust laws.14 In response, legal positivists have drawn a distinction 
between “[t]raditional Natural Law … [which] insist[s] that a putative norm cannot become 
legally valid unless it passes a certain threshold of morality”15 and “contemporary Natural Law,” 
which accepts this idea.16 &is, however, hardly helped as contemporary natural lawyers 
questioned whether, properly understood, there was ever any of the notable natural lawyers who 
GROTIUS TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT (1996); BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: 
STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW 1150-1625 (1997). 
13 HART, supra note 8, at 8. Admittedly, later in the book Hart considers a few other ideas associated with 
natural law, but these ideas were still relatively detached from the work of actual natural lawyers. 
14 Most famously JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 363-66 (2d ed. 2011). In di"erent 
ways the claim has been made by others of a broadly natural law view. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY 
OF LAW 153 (rev. ed. 1969); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 89 (rev. ed. 1978). More recently 
it has been suggested (by a legal positivist) that the di"erence between natural law and legal positivism is that the 
former is only interested in the central case of moral law at the expense of marginal cases and the non-moral 
aspects of law, whereas legal positivism takes a broader interest in both. See John Gardner, Nearly Natural Law, 
52 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 18 (2007). &is, however, is not how natural lawyers (or at least some of them) perceive of 
their enterprise. See, e.g., John Finnis, Law and What I Truly Should Decide, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 107, 111-14 (2003); 
see also MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL LAW IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICS 8-10 (2006). 
15 Andrei Marmor, e Rule of Law and Its Limits, 23 LAW & PHIL. 1, 42 (2004). 
16 Id. at 42 n.66. In fact, the historical dividing line posited by Marmor is mistaken as there are 
“contemporary” natural lawyers who do claim that unjust law is not law. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, 
EDUCATING ONESELF IN PUBLIC: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 303-04 (2000); Philip Soper, In 
Defense of Classical Natural Law in Legal eory: Why Unjust Law is No Law at All, 20 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 201 (2007); Jonathan Crowe, Reviving the Strong Natural Law &esis (unpublished 
manuscript, on le with Author). &e picture among natural lawyers, whether “traditional” or “contemporary,” 
is thus more complex than Marmor envisages it and cannot be demarcated along chronological lines. My 
argument below, however, seeks to identify what unites all (or most) natural lawyers and what separates all (or 
most) of them from contemporary legal positivists. 
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adopted this “traditional” view. &is raised a serious question for legal positivists: if the point of 
legal positivism, if its “insight” as Andrei Marmor called it,17 was familiar to medieval natural 
lawyers, what was the novelty in legal positivism, what was its rst proponents’ point? And 
regardless of how this historical question is resolved, this view raises the di^cult question of 
explaining what it is that stands between legal positivism and natural law today. If contemporary 
natural lawyers agree that unjust law is law, it seems to follow that what is still treated as the most 
foundational debate in jurisprudence—the one that opens virtually all the textbooks—is one on 
which there is no argument at all.18  
In this essay I want to address these questions. I suggest we do so by looking back at the road 
not taken, the one that links legal positivism to utilitarianism. My claim, however, will not be that 
legal positivism was a utilitarian position per se, but rather that it was what might be called a 
metaphysically deep doctrine that was grounded in the very same ideas that led Bentham to his 
utilitarianism. I will argue that unlike contemporary legal positivism that conceives of itself and 
the domain of jurisprudence in highly restricted terms, the philosophers now considered its 
founders saw theorizing about law, just like theorizing about morals, as part of theorizing about 
nature, and about human nature in particular. Where they di"ered from natural lawyers was, rst 
and foremost, in their views on these matters.  
I have two major aims in this essay. I hope, rst, to set the historical record straight, so I o"er 
an account of Hobbes’s and Bentham’s work that seeks to identify what it was that they believed 
and to put their views on law in the proper context of their thought. &e primary aim of this essay, 
however, is not historical. My main aim is to contribute to contemporary jurisprudential debates 
and to suggest that the largely neglected approach of earlier positivists is superior to the view held 
by most contemporary legal positivists. &e two aims are not necessarily congruent. &ere is an 
obvious sense in which talk of Hobbes or Bentham as legal positivists is a historical anachronism. 
&e debate between legal positivism and natural law, in the form one nds in contemporary 
jurisprudence textbooks, is a twentieth century debate that cannot found in jurisprudential 
debates of past centuries. It is not just that the term “positivist” is not found in the work of 
Hobbes, Bentham, or even Austin. It is that the debate as it is understood today was not one that 
17 Marmor, supra note 15, at 42. 
18 Hence the many works that struggle mightily to nd some kind of di"erence between legal positivism and 
natural law, or calling us to reject this dichotomy. See, for example, id.; Gardner, supra note 11, at 226-27; 
Gardner, supra note 14, at 18, 22-23; Brian Bix, On the Dividing Line Between Natural Law eory and Legal 
Positivism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1613, 1621-23 (2000) (focusing on methodological di"erences); J.S. 
Russell, Trial by Slogan: Natural Law and Lex Inuistia Non Est Lex, 19 LAW & PHIL. 433 (2000); NEIL 
MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY 278-79 (2007); MURPHY, supra note 14, 
at 22-24; DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 105 (1984). 
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they were engaged in. &e contemporary debate, at least as understood by contemporary legal 
positivists, is focused on legal validity, but this concept did not play nearly as important a role in 
classical legal positivists’ work.  
&ere is therefore danger in the attempt to match contemporary categories to the ideas of 
theorists who worked against a very di"erent intellectual framework, and in an important respect, 
therefore, it is pointless, and potentially misleading, to debate whether Hobbes or Bentham were 
“really” legal positivists or natural lawyers.19 &e more meaningful question is: To what extent is it 
useful for us to call Hobbes and Bentham “legal positivists”? My answer to this question consists of 
three interrelated points. &e rst is that we draw an explicit link between their ideas and the view 
that (some time later) would come to be known as “positivism,” roughly the view that the 
methods of the “human sciences” are essentially the same as those of the natural sciences. &e 
second point is that the classical legal positivists’ decisive break with natural law ideas prevalent in 
their day is to be found exactly here, in their views about metaphysics or human nature. &e third 
point is to demonstrate how this aspect of their work has been, in my view regrettably, abandoned 
by contemporary legal positivists. &ough all three points are closely related, in this essay I will say 
relatively little about the rst point here, as I discussed it greater detail elsewhere.20  
II. Two Versions of Legal Positivism 
&e idea that putative laws can be immoral and still remain (in a certain sense) “valid” did not 
need the genius of Hobbes or Bentham to be discovered. It was always known, because it is a 
trivial observation. Aristotle, for example, distinguished between the “legally just” and the 
“equitable,” which is “a correction of legal justice.”21 Even more clearly Cicero, by contemporary 
classications natural lawyer par excellence,22 had no di^culty in distinguishing between “legally 
binding conditions or how to answer this and that question for our clients”—what legal positivists 
would now call valid legal norms—and the broader inquiry, in which “we have to encompass the 
entire issue of universal justice and law; what we call civil law will be conned to a small, narrow, 
                                                                
19 Cf. Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. & THEORY 3 (1969).  
20 Priel, supra note 9. 
21 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 98-99 (Oxford University Press, W.D. Ross trans. & Lesley Brown 
ed., 2009) (V.10). 
22 “[L]aw in the proper sense [or as we might say today ‘properly so called’] is right reason in harmony with 
nature. It is spread through the whole human community, unchanging and eternal. … &is law cannot be 
countermanded, nor can it be in any way amended, nor can it be totally rescinded. We cannot be exempted from 
this law by any decree of the Senate or the people….” Cicero, e Republic, in THE REPUBLIC AND THE LAWS 1, 
68-69 (Oxford University Press, Niall Rudd trans., 1998) (III.33). 
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corner of it.”23 He had no di^culty in understanding that “as our whole discourse has to do with 
ordinary ways of thinking, we shall sometimes have to use ordinary language, applying the word 
‘law’ to that which lays down in writing what it wishes to enjoin or forbid. For that’s what the 
man in the street calls law.”24 Aquinas too clearly recognized the possibility of iniquitous or 
immoral laws: “Human laws o*en bring defamation and injury to human beings.”25 Not only that, 
he even provided a typology of the di"erent ways in which they may be unjust.26 &ese thinkers 
were also fully aware of the, utterly obvious, practical implications of disobeying unjust laws. Even 
Augustine, who is usually given credit for rst use of the slogan “unjust law is not law,” should be 
read in context. &e words appearing in the sentence just preceding these famous words consider 
the following hypothetical: “the law bids a soldier to kill the enemy, and if he holds back from the 
bloodshed he pays the penalties from his commander.”27 &e practical implications of failure to 
comply with an unjust law, exactly the consideration John Austin relied upon in his famous 
refutation of natural law,28 were not in question. But those implications were not seen as relevant 
for answering the question whether unjust edicts could be laws. 
What then was the novelty of the earliest philosophers we now call legal positivists? My 
argument will be that Hobbes and Bentham o"ered a distinct approach to legal theory that is very 
di"erent from the work of contemporary legal positivists and in a way is much closer in spirit to 
the approach to jurisprudence found among natural lawyers. &e hallmark of contemporary legal 
positivism is its internality: it seeks to o"er a theory of law from within legal practice, and as such 
                                                                
23 Cicero, e Laws, in THE REPUBLIC AND THE LAWS, supra note 22, at 95, 102-03 (I.17).  
24 Id. at 103 (I.19).  
25 AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS 64 (Hackett, Richard J. Regan trans., 2d ed.  2002) (S.T. 
I-II Q.94 Art.4).  
26 Id. at 65 (S.T. I-II Q.94 Art.4). In Aquinas’s discussion of the conditions under which laws may be 
changed, he says that one such case is when “the existing law is clearly unjust.” Id. At 72 (S.T. I-II Q. 97 Art. 2). 
&ere would be no for such change, if “clearly unjust” laws were not laws. For more on Aquinas’s views on unjust 
laws see John Finnis, e Truth in Legal Positivism, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 
195, 201-03 (Robert P. George ed., 1996). For a more general discussion of the role and di"erent senses of 
positive law in Aquinas’s work see JAMES BERNARD MURPHY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW: 
FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 48-116 (2005). 
27 AUGUSTINE, ON THE FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL, ON GRACE AND FREE CHOICE AND OTHER 
WRITINGS 10 (Peter King ed. & trans., 2010) (§ 1.5.11.33). 
28 “Suppose an act innocuous, or positively benecial, be prohibited by the sovereign under the penalty of 
death; if I commit this act, I shall be tried and condemned, and if I object to the sentence, that it is contrary to 
the law of God, who has commanded that human lawgivers shall not prohibit acts which have no evil 
consequences, the Court of Justice will demonstrate the inconclusiveness of my reasoning by hanging me up.” 
AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 158. 
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one that is built around the way law is understood by lawyers. Such an enterprise is almost by 
denition metaphysically shallow and aims to be politically neutral. &e central concept in the 
e"ort to explain the “nature” of law, legal validity, directs the inquiry to identifying what members 
of the legal community consider to be law. Revealingly, in an interview Hart gave late in his life he 
said about of his main work in jurisprudence that it was “written for lawyers and primarily had 
them in mind.”29 (From this point of view the possibility of “valid” immoral or unjust laws is, to 
put it mildly, not particularly surprising and does not reZect any deep philosophical insight; it is a 
trivial empirical observation.) But in this sense legal positivism simply does not engage natural law 
theory: as we have seen natural lawyers were aware of this observation and thought it worthwhile 
to o"er their theory of law as a challenge to the lawyers’ perspective. Within this approach the 
philosophy of law arrives at law from outside. By this I do not mean that it adopts “the external 
point of view” to legal obligation: this is the mistaken contemporary legal positivist take on the 
classical positivist view. Rather, what I mean is that the classical philosophical work on law seeks 
an account of law as part of a broader picture of nature and human nature.  
As I will argue this is characteristic not only of the work of those theorists we now call natural 
lawyers, but also of those now considered founders of legal positivism. A central aim of this essay is 
to show the signicance of this divide in the characterization of legal theory. I begin by describing, 
in very brief terms, some of the central tenets of the work of Hobbes and Bentham that 
demonstrate my claim. For ease of exposition I will reverse chronological order and discuss 
Bentham rst. 
(a) Jeremy Bentham 
With Bentham a good place to start is morality, not law. Bentham had little patience for most 
moral discourse, to which he refers with characteristic acidity: thus, for instance, he described the 
“summum bonum” as “consummate nonsense.”30 Famously, this attitude extended to talk of 
natural law and natural rights. His basic view on natural rights is found in crisp form in the most 
famous sentence he ever wrote: “Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible 
rights, rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts”.31 As rights were the products of human law, talk 
                                                                
29 Hart Interviewed: H.L.A. Hart in Conversation with David Sugarman, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y 267, 291 (2005); 
see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 44 (2d ed. 2009). 
30 JEREMY BENTHAM, DEONTOLOGY 134 (Amnon Goldworth ed., 1983) (§ I.4). Hobbes held the same 
view: see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 70 (Cambridge University Press, Richard Tuck ed., rev. student ed. 
1996) (ch. 11) [hereina*er HOBBES, LEVIATHAN]. 
31 Jeremy Bentham, Nonsense Upon Stilts, in RIGHTS, REPRESENTATION, AND REFORM: NONSENSE UPON 
STILTS AND OTHER WRITINGS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 317, 330 (Philip Schoeld et al. eds., 2002). 
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of natural law was akin to talk of “cold heat,” “dry moisture,” or “resplendent darkness.”32 Natural 
law was described in similar terms: in the course of his critique of Blackstone Bentham called it a 
“phantom” and a “formidable non-entity.”33 Such ctional concepts as the law of nature or natural 
justice were not just confusing but dangerous as they “serv[ed] as cloak, and pretence, and aliment 
to despotism.”34  
Nonetheless, Bentham did not think that there was no right and wrong in human a"airs. 
(Notice that this very is di"erent from the views of some contemporary legal positivists who were 
drawn to legal positivism exactly because they thought there was no right answer to such 
questions.) &e crucial point for Bentham is that questions of morals have been discussed in the 
wrong way: “every political and moral question ought to be[ put] upon the issue of fact; and 
[thus] mankind [would be] directed into the only true track of investigation which can a"ord 
instruction or hope of rational argument, the track of experiment and observation.”35 And 
Bentham believed he identied the relevant facts, which he presented most famously in the 
opening sentence of the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation: “Nature has 
placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them 
alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.”36 &is, for him, 
was a matter of fact, a generalization based on observation. It was not meant to be an “internal” 
description or reinterpretation of people’s attitudes, for obviously it did not reZect folk morality. 
It was considered a discovery meant to rid us of much of the nonsense and ction that bedevilled 
moral discourse. It was meant to be a scientic (“external”) discovery, one that in turn was 
grounded in his materialist metaphysical worldview. It is this perspective which led him to dismiss 
so much of moral, political, and legal discourse as ction.37  
                                                                
32 All these come from Jeremy Bentham, Supply without Burthen, in 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, ECONOMIC 
WRITINGS 283, 335 (W. Stark ed., 1952).  
33 JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 17, 20 
(J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart, eds., 1977). 
34 JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 28 n.d (J.H. 
Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996) (§ 2.14). 
35 Jeremy Bentham, Observations on the Draughts of Declarations-of-Rights Presented to the Committee of the 
Constitution of the National Assembly of France, in RIGHTS, REPRESENTATION AND REFORM, supra note 31, 177 
at 189.  
36 BENTHAM, supra note 34 at 11 (§ 1.1). 
37 See generally ROSS HARRISON, BENTHAM 18-33 (1983); JAMES STEINTRAGER, BENTHAM 1-27 (1977). 
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Not surprisingly, Bentham held a very similar view of law: “Physical sensibility [is] the ground 
of law—proposition the most obvious and incontestible [sic].”38 To understand law one must start 
not from within legal practice, but from an account of what exists. In his view, for a well-
functioning legal system one had to rst have clear perception of what existed in order to x (in 
both senses of the word “x”) legal language accordingly.39 It should therefore not come as a 
surprise that among Bentham’s unpublished manuscripts there is one entitled “&e Metaphysics 
of Jurisprudence.”40 What should be clear from all this is that Bentham’s problem with natural law 
was not that natural lawyers tried to build legal theory of metaphysical foundations, but that the 
foundations natural lawyers posited were false. &e foundations they posited did not exist, just like 
cold heat did not exist. 
&ese views are clearly very di"erent from what one nds in the work of most contemporary 
legal positivists, but they are also di"erent from some revisionist interpretations of Bentham’s 
work that suggested that Bentham’s views in jurisprudence were motivated by his utilitarianism, 
and not by conceptual analysis.41 &ere can be no doubt that Bentham’s views on law were part of 
his broader utilitarian outlook. Bentham clearly believed that laws were required for attaining 
some happiness and avoiding some pain42 (which shows, by the way, that for him there was a 
necessary connection between law and morality: law was a necessary means for attaining moral 
ends).  
I suspect that  contemporary legal positivists would respond that whatever Bentham’s 
motivations for his views on law had been, what matters (as far as his legal positivism is concerned) 
is that Bentham accepted the conceptual claim of the separability of law as it is from law as it ought 
to be. &is, however, is to simply misunderstand what Bentham was concerned with. Bentham, 
                                                                
38 Bentham manuscripts, University College London, Box 69, p. 10, quoted in DOUGLAS G. LONG, 
BENTHAM ON LIBERTY: JEREMY BENTHAM’S IDEA OF LIBERTY IN RELATION TO HIS UTILITARIANISM 17 
(1977). 
39 See JEREMY BENTHAM, OF THE LIMITS OF THE PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE 286-87 (Philip 
Schoeld ed., 2010). 
40 Bentham manuscripts, University College London, Box 69, p. 214, quoted in STEINTRAGER, supra note 
37, at 23.  
41 See e.g,, POSTEMA, supra note __, at 328-36; Philip Schoeld, Jeremy Bentham and H.L.A. Hart’s 
‘Utilitarian Tradition in Jurisprudence’, 1 JURISPRUDENCE 147 (2010).  
42 “&e business of government is to promote the happiness of the society, by punishing and rewarding.” 
BENTHAM, supra note 34, at 74 (§ 7.1); see also id. at 282 (§ 17.2), and the material quoted in J.R. Dinwiddy, 
Bentham on Private Ethics and the Principle of Utility, in RADICALISM AND REFORM IN BRITAIN, 1780-1850 
315, 329 (1992). For further discussion on the role Bentham gave to legislation and government in the pursuit of 
happiness see L.J. HUME, BENTHAM AND BUREAUCRACY 93-96 (1981); L.J. Hume, Jeremy Bentham and the 
Nineteenth Century Revolution in Government, 10 HIST. J. 361 (1967). 
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like natural lawyers but unlike contemporary legal positivists, comes to his views about law from 
an underlying metaphysical worldview, not from observing at the attitudes of participants in legal 
practice or from careful analysis of the concepts they use. &is is why Bentham, despite famously 
denying the existence of natural law, could write without contradiction that natural law should be 
better understood as “conformity of the thing in question to the proper standard, whatever that 
may be,” to which he added his own gloss: “On most occasions … it will be better to say utility: 
utility is clearer, as referring more explicitly to pain and pleasure.”43 To suggest that all this is 
separate from his views on law is simply to ignore almost everything Bentham wrote and ascribe to 
him a view he never defended.  
(b) omas Hobbes 
Hobbes is a more complex case, one that at rst sight looks very di"erent. Hobbes’s writings are 
replete with references to both the laws of nature and the right of nature, and they are central 
ingredients to his contractarian argument about the move from the state of nature to civil society. 
(Bentham, by contrast, dismissed contract arguments as grounded in ction.) It thus seems plainly 
false to suggest that Hobbes denied the existence of natural rights or natural law, and it seems that 
in his account natural laws play a more “active” role than mere standards by which positive law is 
to be assessed; there is also no doubt that in various important respects Hobbes and Bentham 
ideas are very di"erent.44 And yet, in many respects Hobbes’s interpretation of natural law 
consisted in a radical departure from earlier ideas. He had no patience for the ideas of the 
“Schoolmen,” the humanistic scholars who sought to revive the classical (Greek–Roman) natural 
law tradition;45 it is with him, for example, that we nd, probably for the rst time, the idea of 
liberty as non-interference, and his rejection of classical, republican, idea of freedom as non-
domination.46 More fundamentally, and more importantly, for my argument, Hobbes saw his 
views about natural law as part of a broader grand theory. It is instructive to consider the structure 
                                                                
43 BENTHAM, supra note 34, at 27 n.d (§ 2.14). 
44 On the similarities and di"erences between Hobbes and Bentham see generally James E. Crimmins, 
Bentham and Hobbes: An Issue of In:uence, 63 J. HIST. IDEAS 677 (2002). 
45 HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 59 (ch. 8), 85 (ch. 12); cf. John Finnis, Natural Law: e Classical 
Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Jules Coleman & 
Scott Shapiro, eds., 2002) 1, 5-6 [hereina*er OXFORD HANDBOOK] (arguing that contemporary work in the 
natural law tradition is continuous with the classical tradition of, say, Aquinas and rejects the natural law ideas 
found in Hobbes). Interestingly, Hobbes adopted these views relatively late in his life. On this shi* in Hobbes’s 
approach see QUENTIN SKINNER, REASON AND RHETORIC IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES 215-326 (1996). 
46 Both issues are discussed in QUENTIN SKINNER, HOBBES AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY (2008). Bentham 
shared this conception of liberty. &e signicance of this conceptual shi* to jurisprudence has not been 
su^ciently explored. 
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of he maintain in his most important philosophical works: in both Leviathan and in his earlier 
works, he maintain a tripartite structure that began with metaphysical questions, proceeded to a 
discussion of human nature, and concluded in discussion of moral and political theory. &is was 
no mere question of neat organization. &roughout his work he was much inZuenced by the 
advances in science of his time and held a strongly materialistic view of nature, which he thought 
was relevant to all his ideas.47 Hobbes considered it one of the greatest strengths of his work to 
have abandoned the shaky foundations of scholastic moral and political thinking and put in their 
stead a theory grounded in a correct view of nature. It was only with him, Hobbes thought, that 
morals and politics became a science.  
&is is not the place for a detailed of Hobbes’s philosophy in its entirety. In what follows I will 
try instead to demonstrate the importance of these background ideas to his thought on natural 
and human law. I wish to demonstrate that for all their di"erences there is at least one important 
regard Hobbes’s novel treatment of natural law justies separating him from much of the natural 
law tradition that preceded him and placing him close to Bentham.48  
It is well known that Hobbes did not think that people could achieve peace on their own and 
that an authority over them was necessary to prevent life from descending to chaos. &us, for 
Hobbes laws were moral imperative, “the procuration of the safety of the people; to which the 
sovereign is obliged by the Law of Nature”.49 As he elaborated on this point:  
&e RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use 
his own power as he will himselfe for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; 
and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the 
aptest means thereunto. 
By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signication of the word, the absence of external 
impediments; which impediments may o* take away part of a man's power to do what he would, but 
cannot hinder him from using the power le* him according as his judgement and reason shall dictate to 
him.50 
In Hobbes’s account natural right is the state of absolute freedom, the ability to do as one wishes 
in the absence of any laws. It is not a normative concept, but simply a factual statement about 
                                                                
47 For an extended discussion see Priel, supra note 9. 
48 For illuminating discussions of these issues see PEREZ ZAGORIN, HOBBES AND THE LAW OF NATURE 
ch.1-2 (2009) [hereina*er ZAGORIN, LAW OF NATURE]; Perez Zagorin, Hobbes as a eorist of Natural Law, 17 
INTELLECTUAL HIST. REV. 239 (2007). I do not, however, fully agree with his reconciliation of Hobbes’s natural 
law and legal positivism, as in id. at 253. 
49 HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 231 (ch. 30). He further explains that “by safety here, is not 
meant a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life….” Id. 
50 Id. at 91 (ch. 14) 
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what people can (physically) do in the absence of external restraints. &e sole purpose of enacting 
law is limiting that natural right for the sake of peace.51 
Hobbes also o"ered a distinct understanding of natural law. It was novel in two respects: rst, 
according to Hobbes natural law is a precept of reason concerned with survival, and not with good 
and evil or justice, and second, natural law is not binding in the state of nature (unless commanded 
by God). Second, despite people’s natural dispositions to follow it, he claimed that as an empirical 
matter it would not be obeyed in the state of nature. Hobbes is clear that “every private man is Judge 
of Good and Evill actions … in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no Civill Lawes…. 
But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of Good and Evill actions, is the Civill Law….”52 
Likewise, in the state of nature “nothing can be Unjust.”53  
What is the place of natural laws in this story? Humans have a natural disposition for 
survival,54 and the natural laws are “dictates of Reason … for they are but Conclusions, or 
&eoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves”.55 As such 
they “oblige in foro interno” Hobbes explains that “they bind to a desire that they should take 
place: but in foro externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not alwayes”.56 So Hobbes uses here 
the word “oblige” in a special sense, roughly that of a combination of rational precept towards self-
preservation and a desire for their existence. As humans naturally seek their preservation they can 
recognize these precepts as conducive to that aim (by contrast from the drunk and the insane who 
                                                                
51 Id. at 185 (ch. 26) (“the Right of Nature, that is, the naturall Liberty of man, may by the Civill Law be 
abridged, and restrained; nay, the end of making Lawes, is no other, but such Restraint; without the which there 
cannot possibly be any Peace.”); see also id. at 200 (ch. 26). 
52 Id. at 223 (ch. 29), also id. at 110 (ch. 15) (“Good and Evill, are names that signied our appetites, and 
Aversions, which in di"erent tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are di"erent”).  
53 Id. at 90 (ch. 13).  
54 “&e greatest good for each is his own preservation. For nature is so arranged that all desire good for 
themselves.” &omas Hobbes, On Man, in MAN AND CITIZEN 33, 48 (DE HOMINE AND DE CIVE) (Hackett, 
Bernard Gert, ed., Charles T. Wood et al. trans., 1991) (§11.6). 
55 HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 111 (ch. 15). 
56 Id. at 110 (ch. 15). &is shows the anachronism in Dyzenhaus’s interpretation, for in Hobbes’s account 
there is no question of whether to “resolve[] … conZict[s] between positive law and natural law in favour of the 
latter.” David Dyzenhaus, Hobbes and the Legitimacy of Law, 20 LAW & PHIL. 461, 467 (2001). Likewise 
Dyzenhaus’s claim that Hobbes’s natural laws are “not about the psychological state of readiness of mind to obey, 
but about the obligation that stems from having reasons for obedience,” id. at 473, appears to be inconsistent 
with the tenor of Hobbes’s discussion.  
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lose this capacity).57 &is helps us understand in what sense Hobbes can say that the natural laws 
are “immutable and eternall” and why their opposites—“Injustice, Ingratitudue, Arrogance, Pride, 
Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest”—“can never be lawfull”:58 &ey are immutable and 
eternal because the natural inclination for self-preservation is immutable (itself a nding Hobbes 
derives from his observation of humans and animals), and one that Hobbes thinks his natural laws 
invariably help sustain. And when Hobbes says their opposites cannot be made lawful, he means 
that they cannot be natural laws for a simple reason, that as a matter of fact they are not conducive 
to self-preservation: “For it can never be that Warre shall preserve life, and Peace destroy it.”59 
&e cause of the human predicament lies in conZict between this human desire for self-
preservation and another desire, the pursuit of power. For in addition to seeking their self-
preservation—and to being able to recognize the laws that are instrumentally rational means for 
this end of self-preservation—humans also have a “generall inclination … a perpetuall and restlesse 
desire of Power a*er power, that ceaseath onely in Death”.60 In other words “the Lawes of Nature 
… without the terror of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our Naturall 
Passions….”61 It is for this reason that “notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature …, if there be no 
Power erected … every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution 
against all other men”.62 For this reason it is misleading to call the natural laws “law”: “men use to 
call by the name of Lawes, but improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or &eoremes …; whereas 
Law, properly is the word of him, that by right hath command over others. But yet if we consider 
the same &eoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then 
they are properly called Lawes”.63  
                                                                
57 &is explains why Hobbes treats drunkenness as a breach of natural law. See THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE 
CITIZEN 54 (Richard Tuck & Michael Silverthorne eds., 1997) (§ 3.27n). 
58 HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 110 (ch. 15). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 70 (ch. 11). 
61 Id. at 117 (ch. 17). 
62 Id. at 117-18 (ch. 17). &ere are two possible explanations for the question why the natural laws do not 
su^ce to prevent war of all against all. One is a story about weakness of the will, a conZict between reason and 
passion. &is is the explanation presented in the text. &ere is an alternative answer that is more thoroughly 
rationalistic, in which the state of nature is akin to a n-person prisoner’s dilemma. On this view fully rational 
behavior can lead to a suboptimal social equilibrium. Both interpretations have their defenders, but for the 
purposes of my argument, that seeks only to highlight the way Hobbes characterizes natural law and the place it 
has in his argument, it matters little why natural law will fail. Both versions of the argument are “naturalistic.” 
63 Id. at 111 (ch. 15). Also: the natural laws “are not properly Lawes, but qualities that dispose men to peace, 
and to obedience.” Id. at 185 (ch. 26). 
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&ese are the bare bones of Hobbes’s views on the origins of law. Any attempt to t his view 
neatly into the contemporary labels of “legal positivism” and “natural law” faces severe 
interpretative di^culties. While certain aspects of his view when taken in isolation may be similar 
to certain aspects of contemporary theories, Hobbes’s views are complex (and not entirely free 
from internal tensions) and the supercial similarities tend to betray more profound di"erences. 
As he sought to break away from the work of earlier natural lawyers, it is no surprising that his 
account looks very di"erent from the work of contemporary natural lawyers who work from 
within the Aristotelian-&omist tradition of natural law. &ere are also signicant di"erences 
with the work of other contemporary legal theorists who are o*en classied as natural lawyers of 
some sort: It is, for example, di^cult to classify him as a natural lawyer in the Fullerian sense of 
insisting on certain procedural requirements as condition of legality, as Hobbes explicitly stated 
that “no Law can be unjust. &e Law is made by the Sovereign Power, and all that is done by such 
Power, is warranted, and owed by every one of the people; and that which every many will have so, no 
many can say is unjust.”64 &e di"erences between his ideas and those of Ronald Dworkin are 
profound as well, rst because Dworkin denies that there is any metaphysical foundation to 
morals, but also (and more importantly) because Dworkin’s conception of morals and freedom is 
broadly republican, whereas Hobbes had strongly anti-republican views, and o"ered a naturalistic 
account of freedom.65  
                                                                
64 HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 239 (ch. 30) (emphasis added). Even when the sovereign 
transgresses against natural law, his transgression is only against God. Id. at 148 (ch. 21). Dyzenhaus tries to turn 
Hobbes into a precursor of Fuller by highlighting some of the requirements of legality in Hobbes’s text. See 
Dyzenhaus, supra note 53, at 491; see also ZAGORIN, LAW OF NATURE, supra note 48, at 95. Dyzenhaus’s 
interpretation is implausible because unlike most people who are bound by the natural laws and by the civil laws 
that have the same content as well, the sovereign, by denition, is not subject to the civil laws. And given that the 
requirements of legality are natural laws, they are ahicted by the very same problems that Hobbes thinks will 
lead to the violation of all other natural laws.  
65 For an attempt to argue that we should understand Hobbes as a kind of Dworkinian natural lawyer see 
Michael Cu"aro, On omas Hobbes’s Fallible Natural Law eory, 28 HIST. PHIL. Q. 175 (2011). Cu"aro 
points out some interesting similarities between Hobbes’s views on interpretation of the law of nature and 
Dworkin’s views on principles. See id at 181-83. &ese, however, do not su^ce to establish his interpretation. 
&ere are two di^culties with his approach. First, if we wanted to match Hobbes with contemporary views, then 
Cu"aro’s interpretation is consistent with the view that Hobbes was an exclusive legal positivist, a view that in 
fact ts his interpretation of Hobbes’s ideas much better than the inclusive interpretation he considers. Second 
and more important, Cu"aro ignores the sense in which for Dworkin morality is a communal enterprise that is 
“constructed” in debate. Put somewhat crudely Dworkin has a republican conception of morality and politics, 
and Hobbes was as anti-republican as one could get. &e fact Cu"aro himself stresses, that for Hobbes 
interpretation cannot alter natural law, see id. at 184-85, is anti-Dworkinian, for whom true (correct) morality 
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Similarly, while the temptation to classify Hobbes as a legal positivist is understandable a*er 
reading passages such as the one quoted in the last paragraph, the similarities between his and 
contemporary positivists’ views are equally problematic. From a contemporary perspective the 
latter quotation seems to suggest that Hobbes thought that “legal validity” does not depend on 
legal content, and that makes him sound like a legal positivist. But delve a little deeper and crucial 
di"erences appear. Hobbes reached his views on law not from looking at legal practice, but rather 
by ignoring, or rather challenging, it. His claims about what law, even those that look “positivist,” 
are not conceptual claims, but rather the conclusions of a political argument,66 which in turn 
Hobbes believed was grounded in his views on human nature.67 
&is di"erence may seem slight, but its signicance is profound. &e view Hobbes rejects here 
is the essence of contemporary legal positivism: both methodologically, in the sense that a theory 
of law does not depend on political theory, and substantively, in the sense that the foundational 
concept of jurisprudence is validity and that the “rule of recognition” is a purely social, not 
political concept. To the extent that legal positivism is understood by its proponents as part of the 
politically neutral inquiry of “analytic jurisprudence,” then Hobbes cannot be associated with that 
endeavor. 
III. The Closing of the Positivist Mind 
(a) From Classical to Contemporary Legal Positivism 
&e debate between classical legal positivists and natural lawyers was, at bottom a debate about 
metaphysics. &is is very di"erent from the way the contemporary debate between legal positivism 
and natural law is usually understood. &e contemporary debate is about the sort of connection 
that exists between natural law and human law. In this version “natural law” is treated as 
synonymous with morality68 (a view that would have been considered as, at best, inaccurate by 
both Hobbes and Bentham) and legal positivism has been transformed to the claim that (human) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and law (the two for him are not very di"erent) are the product of a “chain novel” process of constant 
construction. Both the idea of immutable natural laws and of the exclusivity of the sovereign in determining the 
content of natural law (about which see in particular THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A 
PHILOSOPHER AND A STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND 67 (1971) (1681, written around 1666) 
[26-27] [hereina*er HOBBES, DIALOGUE].  
66 See Part IV in<a for more on this. 
67 See generally Priel, supra note 9. 
68 &is is explicit in, for example, Garnder, supra note 14, at 22.  
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law is separate or distinct from natural law (i.e., from morality).69 &e opposing view, natural law, 
has been similarly refashioned as the view that human law has some kind of connection with 
morality. Much of what has been written in “general jurisprudence” since the publication of e 
Concept of Law—the debates between positivists and Ronald Dworkin, the debates between legal 
positivists and Lon Fuller, the proliferation of various strands of legal positivism (especially, 
“inclusive” and “exclusive” legal positivism)—is based on this contemporary understanding of 
natural law and legal positivism, one that is largely without a trace in works from earlier periods.70  
&is is a great yet underappreciated shi* in the nature of disagreements in legal theory. 
Recognizing it helps us understand one of the most curious aspects of contemporary debates in 
jurisprudence. Contemporary natural law theorists o*en write as though the old debate is going 
on; hence one nds in their writings the same depth of argument one nds in the work of earlier 
natural lawyers and in the work of classical legal positivists. Whatever are the di"erences among 
them all natural lawyers seek to understand the fundamental philosophical questions of law as 
part of a broader inquiry, which depends ultimately on one’s views on human nature.71 By 
                                                                
69 For this reason it has o*en been claimed that (contemporary) legal positivism is agnostic on questions of 
metaethics. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 166-67 (1999); HART, supra note 8, at 254; 
Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, in RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY 
JURISPRUDENCE 73, 85 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1984). Such statements are false, or at least inaccurate, with regard 
to classical legal positivism.  
70 In recent years there has been a tendency among self-styled legal positivists to accept that there are 
necessary connections between law and morality. See JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND 
INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 168 (2009); Gardner, supra note 11, at 
223; Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1835 (2008); Jules L. 
Coleman, Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism, 22 RATIO JURIS 359, 383 (2009). &is, together with the 
recognition that (most) natural lawyers do not deny that legal norms can be immoral, see text accompanying note 
16 supra, leaves legal theorists scrambling to nd something to separate legal positivism and natural law. See note 
18 supra. 
71 &ere is, more precisely, a debate among contemporary natural lawyers about the proper foundation for 
natural law theory, and the place of human nature in it. On one side stand those who believe that a theory of 
practical reason is relatively independent of an account of human nature. Proponents of the second view believe 
that an account of practical reason must ultimately be based upon a theory of human nature. For a summary of 
the di"erent views (and a defense of the former) see Robert P. George, Some Recent Criticisms of Natural Law, 55 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1372-74, 1378-83, 1407-28 (1988) (reviewing LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND 
JUSTICE (1987) and RUSSELL HITTINGER, A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW NATURAL LAW THEORY (1987)). For an 
outsider to these debates the di"erences between the views do not seem huge. It is notable that even proponents 
of the rst view insist that a theory of law can be derived only from engagement in substantive concern with 
normative questions of value, see Finnis, supra note 14, at 115, and they do not deny the connection between the 
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contrast contemporary legal positivism has been transformed into a philosophical standalone, a 
view that does not depend on any metaphysical worldview;72 and so in order to have a debate with 
natural law its proponents had to invent an equivalent version of natural law, a kind of similar, 
standalone non-metaphysical doctrine. In doing so they have been discussing and trying to refute a 
view that no-one has ever held. &e result is the odd (and yet, I trust, familiar) state of 
contemporary debate in which disputants both struggle to nd di"erences between legal 
positivism and natural law but at the same time seem to be talking past each other. At the 
“conceptual” level—whether there can be unjust laws, or whether morality is a condition of legal 
validity—there may indeed be little to debate and disagreements, if they exist, seem verbal. But 
this happens only because what does not get discussed, what indeed is assumed by one side to be 
irrelevant to the debate, is profoundly di"erent. Because one side grounds its argument in 
metaphysics while the other insists on not having any, there is a lingering feeling that despite 
seemingly in agreement on everything the two sides could not be further apart.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
foundations of practical reason and a theory of human nature, see FINNIS, supra note 14, at 33-34 (accepting that 
“[t]he basic forms of good grasped by practical understanding are what is good for human beings with the nature 
they have” and that “‘were man’s nature di"erent, so would be his duties’” (quoting D.J. O’CONNOR, AQUINAS 
AND NATURAL LAW 18 (1967))); George, supra, at 1415-17. 
&ere is no corresponding debate among contemporary legal positivists. Indeed, I suspect most 
contemporary legal positivists are only dimly aware of this debate among natural lawyers. To the extent that they 
are aware of it, one judges from their ignoring it that they consider it irrelevant to addressing jurisprudential 
questions. Even proponents of legal positivism who have sought to tie their theory of law to an account of 
practical reasoning have largely limited themselves to “conceptual analysis” of the building blocks of practical 
reason that is required for a theory of law: the “logical features of concepts like value, reason for action or norm 
and the nature of the rules of inference governing practical reasoning.” JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND 
NORMS 10 (2d ed. 1990). 
72 RAZ, supra note 70, at 228 (“Metaphysical pictures are, when useful at all, illuminating summaries of 
central aspects of our practices. &ey are, in other words, accountable to our practices, rather than our practices 
being accountable to them.”); Hart, supra note 1, at 620-21 (to argue as natural lawyers do regarding unjust law 
“would seem to raise a whole host of philosophical issues before it can be accepted. … So when we have the ample 
resources of plain speech we must not present the moral criticism of institutions as propositions of a disputable 
philosophy”); HART, supra note 8, at 192; SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 44 (2011) (“For our purposes … the[] 
deep metaphysical questions [about the origins of a legal system] will largely be ignored”); cf. Gardner, supra note 
14, at 22.  
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&e following table summarizes my argument so far: 
 Metaphysical legal philosophy Non-metaphysical legal 
philosophy 
Non-materialist 
conception of 
nature 
Natural law Contemporary legal 
positivism 
Materialist 
conception of 
nature 
Classical legal positivism Felix Cohen(?)73 
&e table brings out the di"erent ways in which contemporary and classical legal positivism 
are opposed to natural law, but also the sense in which they are further apart from each other than 
each is apart from natural law. It also helps us see how one can be both a legal positivist in the 
classical sense, even a rather extreme one at that, while in another sense a natural lawyer. Indeed, it 
is as a result of this analysis that we can see why both legal positivists and natural lawyers have been 
claiming Hobbes and even Bentham as their own, and also why there is no need to decide on this 
matter one way or the other.  
(b) e Invented History of Contemporary Legal Positivism 
&e non-metaphysical version of legal positivism is not just the one that dominates contemporary 
debates with natural lawyers, it is also projected backwards onto the work of classical positivists 
Hobbes and Bentham resulting in interpretations of their work that leave out almost everything 
they said. Marmor, as we have seen, o"ered the standard story on the di"erence between 
traditional and contemporary natural lawyers, also provides in capsule form also the typical 
account of the historical development of legal positivism:  
                                                                
73 I mention Felix Cohen in this category tentatively and only for completeness’s sake as I do not discuss his 
views beyond this footnote. Felix Cohen was inZuenced by the work of the logical positivists, who famously 
rejected all metaphysics. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. 
L. REV. 809, 827 (1935) (“&e task of modern philosophy is the salvaging of whatever signicance attaches to the 
traditional concepts of metaphysics through the redenition of these concepts as functions of actual 
experience”). At the same time Cohen expressed some views we would now associate with legal positivism, see 
e.g., Felix Cohen, e Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201, 205 (1931) (“Law is law, whether it be 
good or bad, and only upon the admission of this truism can a meaningful discussion of the goodness and 
badness of law rest”). But basing his views on logical positivism puts him in quite a di"erent category from that of 
contemporary legal positivists: he may have held that view that all metaphysical discourse, unless empirically 
redened, is meaningless. &is is quite di"erent from the view that metaphysics is meaningful but irrelevant to 
legal philosophy. 
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Early legal positivists followed Hobbes’ insight that the law is, essentially, an instrument of political 
sovereignty, and they maintained that the basic source of legal validity resides in the facts constituting 
political sovereignty. Law they thought, is basically a command of the sovereign. Later legal positivists 
modied this view, maintaining that social conventions, and not the facts about sovereignty, constitute 
the grounds of law.74  
While the early and later legal positivists di"ered on this score they shared what Marmor 
considers “[t]he main insight of legal positivism”, namely “that the conditions of legal validity are 
determined by social facts.”75  
&is passage neatly captures the invented tradition of legal positivism, the one that treats legal 
validity as the central question of jurisprudence, and then reads this concern into the work of the 
classical legal positivists.76 It is, however, historically and philosophically confused. First, it should 
be noted that the idea of law as a command did not originate with Hobbes but was familiar long 
before him.77 Beyond this, it is hard to assess Marmor’s exegetical claim because he does not 
provide any reference to Hobbes’s work in support his reading, but as far as I know Hobbes did 
not write anything that could plausibly be interpreted as concerned with the question of legal 
validity as the term is currently understood. As I tried to demonstrate above in my outline of his 
view, the motivation, emphasis and focus of his attention have always been on providing an 
account of legitimate political authority that builds on the more basic building blocks of what the 
world and mankind are like. It is true that Hobbes did say some things that to the casual reader 
may look like a discussion of legal validity. In A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of 
the Common Laws of England, a relatively late work, he wrote:  
[Lawyer:] Are not the Canons of the Church part of the Law of England, as also the Imperial Law used 
in the Admiralty, and the Customs of particular places, and the by-Laws of Corporations, and Courts of 
Judicature. 
[Philosopher:] Why not? for they were all Constituted by the Kings of England; and though the Civil 
Law used in the Admiralty were at rst the Statutes of the Roman Empire, yet because they are in force by 
no other Authority than that of the King, they are now the Kings Laws, and the Kings Statutes. &e same 
we may say of the Canons; such of them as we have retained, made by the Church of Rome, have been no 
                                                                
74 Marmor, supra note 15, at 41-42.  
75 Id. at 41 (emphasis in original). 
76 It also, erroneously in my view, ascribes this concern with validity on contemporary legal philosophers 
(such as Dworkin) whose writings clearly are not about validity, which in turn is related to the untying of the 
links between legal and political philosophy. See Dan Priel, e Place of Legitimacy in Legal eory, 57 MCGILL 
L.J. (forthcoming 2011).  
77 See Gerald J Postema, Law as Command: e Model of Command in Modern Jurisprudence, 11 PHIL. 
ISSUES 470, 471-74 (2001).  
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Law, nor of any force in England, since the beginning of Queen Elizabeth’s Raign, but by Virtue of the 
Great Seal of England.78 
&is looks like legal validity, even a precursor of Hart’s rule of recognition. Crucially, though, 
for Hobbes the di"erence between the pre-legal and the legal is not determined by the mere 
empirical observation of obedience, but rather on the basis of law as a matter of Hobbes’s political 
theory.79 &e notion of legal validity is one that takes community understanding of what law is as 
given and tries to give a theoretical account of it; Hobbes, on the other hand, rejected lawyers’ 
understanding of what constituted law: he rejected Coke’s views that sought to establish the 
common law as having authority independent of the sovereign’s,80 and he was willing to recognize 
as law certain things that would not have been accepted as such by the legal community. In the 
Dialogue, a*er o"ering his denition of law, the philosopher, Hobbes’s alter ego, is challenged by 
the lawyer that by his denition, “the Kings Proclamation under the Great Seal of England is a 
Law” to which the philosopher replies “Why not?”81 Similarly, Bentham, with his view that the 
entire common law is not really law,82 was equally dismissive of the project of accounting for 
lawyers’ attitudes. 
Legal validity is a concept that makes sense, if at all, only within the framework of an attempt 
to report accepted attitudes (typically of lawyers) as to what counts as law. As such it is a concept 
that is part and parcel and of the contemporary attempt to refashion legal positivism as a non-
metaphysical doctrine. Within this e"ort legal validity serves as the alternative to the metaphysical 
foundations on which the theories of classical legal positivists were based. It plays no explanatory role 
in a metaphysically deep theory. 
Putting legal validity to one side a di"erent idea may be worth examining in charting the shi* 
from classical to contemporary legal positivism. In the work of Hobbes and Bentham (and even 
Austin) the command theory is primarily a view regarding legal authority. In modern parlance we 
may say that these theorists sought to show how there is no necessary connection between law and 
                                                                
78 HOBBES, DIALOGUE, supra note 65, at 62-63 [18]; see also HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 184-85, 
185-86 (c. 26). 
79 My conclusion here is similar to that of Jeremy Waldron, Legal and Political Philosophy, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK, supra note 45, 352 at 366-68, although more than him I think it shows the sense in which what I 
call classical legal positivism is fundamentally at odds with contemporary legal positivism.  
80 HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 186-87, 191-94 (c. 26). 
81 HOBBES, DIALOGUE, supra note 65, at 71 [33]; see also the quote accompanying note 78 above.  
82 BENTHAM, supra note 39, at 25-26; BENTHAM, supra note 36, at 8 (Preface), among many other places. 
To the same e"ect is his discussion on the extension of “law” to edicts given by a single monarch as sovereign, 
where he rejected prevalent linguistic usage. See BENTHAM, supra note 39, at 29-32. 
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morality with regard to the question of law’s normativity. Consistent with their metaphysical 
views they sought to o"er an account of how law creates obligations that does not depend on 
moral premises. &is was the essence of the command theory: obligations according to Hobbes 
arise “not from their own Nature, (for nothing is more easily broken than a mans word,) but from 
Feare of some evill consequence upon the rupture”.83 When Hobbes later dened law as a 
“Command … addressed to one formerly obliged to obey [the commander]”,84 it was part of his 
view that political obligation does not depend on morals. Even Austin, who in other respects 
marks the beginning of the transition towards contemporary legal positivism, is, in this regard, not 
very di"erent: “the party bound by a command is bound by the prospect of an evil.”85  
Hart is famous for subjecting the command theory to withering criticism, but he accepted the 
classical positivist idea that legal obligation is distinct from moral obligation, that legal rights are 
distinct from moral rights. In his proposed alternative to the command theory—what has come to 
be known as the “practice theory of norms”—Hart, like the classical legal positivists, sought a non-
moral (“positivist”) account of law’s normativity.86 With this one matter Hart kept a threadbare 
connection between his views and those of the classical legal positivists. But with him the 
fundamental concept of legal positivism was no longer normativity but validity; and so a*er him 
having a non-moral account of normativity was no longer thought necessary for one’s positivist 
credentials. &is led to the next stage in the development of the idea of legal positivism: not, as 
Hart (like the classical legal positivists) thought, by distinguishing legal obligation from moral 
obligation, but rather by separating validity from normativity.87 &us, by the end of the process 
the concept of legal validity has become so central one could be a legal positivist of good standing 
in spite of having a moral account of law’s normativity, for in the most recent version of legal 
positivism the separation between law and morality was asserted only with regard to legal validity. 
With this we could say the shi* from classical to contemporary legal positivism was complete.  
To summarize: the shi* from classical to contemporary legal positivism involved not changing 
views on legal validity, but a reorientation of jurisprudence by placing legal validity at its center. 
&is shi* proved such a spectacular success that it required a reinterpretation of classical legal 
positivists’ work in order to present it as though it was concerned with legal validity; at the same 
time, the sort of questions that they were actually interested in have not only been ignored, but are 
o*en nowadays treated as not really belonging to jurisprudence. 
                                                                
83 HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 93 (ch. 14); see also HOBBES, supra note 57, at 175 (§ XV.7). 
84 HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 30, at 183 (ch. 26). 
85 AUSTIN, supra note 27, at 23. 
86 See HART, supra note 7, at 144-47, 158-61 (1982). 
87 See RAZ, supra note 29, at 158; Gardner, supra note 11, at 213. Raz rejected Hart’s views on legal 
obligation in RAZ, supra note 102, at 269-82. 
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IV. Three Methodological Comments 
I believe there is much to be said in favor of classical legal positivism. Even if ultimately false, it is 
in my view far superior to contemporary legal positivism. To state just one reason why a legal 
philosopher might be more interested in it, classical legal positivism is a doctrine to which 
philosophers may well contribute; contemporary legal positivism, despite its philosophical 
aspiration is, I think, either an empirical observation or a linguistic stipulation. On either legal 
philosophers have little to contribute, which is why I judge the dominant conceptual version of 
legal positivism of the last *y years to have been a rather spectacular failure. However, a full 
blown defense of a modern version of classical legal positivism cannot be undertaken here. Instead, 
I will dedicate this last section of the essay to three questions of method, of how to get to a 
contemporary version of classical legal positivism. &ey are particularly important given the 
centrality of methodological debates to contemporary jurisprudence.  I will rst consider the 
question whether the two versions of legal positivism may nd common ground in a shared 
methodology. I will consider and reject a suggestion by Brian Leiter that may be interpreted in this 
way. &e second subsection is, in a way, an application of my argument of the rst. Specically, I 
consider there what role, if any, should be given to the internal point of view within classical legal 
positivism. My conclusion on the matter is rather negative: I argue that the internal point of view 
is tied to contemporary legal positivism; with its demise much of the motivation for adopting the 
internal point of view no longer holds much sway. &e third subsection moves to a somewhat 
di"erent territory. I consider there the potential challenge that if my arguments about the 
substantive and methodological di"erences between the two versions of legal positivism are so 
signicant, it is wrong—indeed, it may be positively misleading—to use the same term for both. 
(a) Can Classical and Contemporary Legal Positivism Be Joined by their Method? 
It may be the case that if one is a metaphysical positivist a certain version of legal positivism 
follows. If this is true, it already somewhat undermines contemporary legal positivists’ attempts to 
draw allegiance with classical legal positivists because the intellectual motivations for classical and 
contemporary legal positivism are entirely di"erent: contemporary legal positivism seems 
motivated by their concern for a clear distinction between law and morality and perhaps more 
generally between law and non-law when observed from the perspective of legal practitioners 
whereas classical legal positivists are there to explain the foundations of legitimate political 
authority and the role of law within such structure as they emerge from their particular view of 
(human) nature.  
Perhaps, then, it could be shown that despite these fundamental substantive di"erences, the 
two versions of legal positivism could be accommodated in their methodology. I will examine this 
question by considering an argument advanced by Brian Leiter that, though not directly 
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addressing this question, may be understood as suggesting such a possibility. Leiter is a leading 
proponent of the view that seeks to ground legal positivism on metaphysical grounds broadly 
similar to those of Hobbes and Bentham.88 Leiter seems to think there is a fairly straightforward 
link between “naturalism”—roughly what I call metaphysical positivism—and contemporary 
“exclusive” legal positivism; my arguments so far show, I hope, why I think this view is mistaken.89 
But in some of his writings Leiter suggests a weaker version of naturalism. Adopting something 
like this view may look like the metaphysically shallow basis that could unite contemporary and 
classical legal positivists. I think this suggestion will not do either, and in this subsection will try to 
explain why. 
Leiter distinguishes between two distinct versions of naturalism, one a set of methodological 
theses, which, following him, I will call “M-naturalism,” and another a set of substantive theses 
(“S-naturalism”). Leiter takes it that naturalism is “always ?rst a methodological view to the e"ect 
that philosophical theorizing should be continuous with empirical inquiry in the sciences.”90 
Within M-naturalism he further distinguishes between “Results Continuity,” which is the view 
that “the claims of philosophical theories be supported by the results of successful sciences,”91 and 
the more modest “Methods Continuity,” which “demands only that philosophical theories 
emulate the ‘methods’ of inquiry and styles of explanation characteristic of successful sciences.”92 
By contrast Leiter denes S-naturalism as “either the (ontological) view that the only things that 
exist are natural or physical; or the (semantic) view that a suitable philosophical analysis of any 
concept must show it to be amenable to empirical inquiry.”93 Leiter argues legal philosophers 
should adopt M-naturalism.94  
                                                                
88 BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND 
NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2007). Surprisingly, Leiter does not seek to reconnect his ideas on legal 
philosophy, and legal positivism more specically, to that of Bentham and Hobbes. Even more surprisingly, 
Leiter is sympathetic to Hart’s work.  
89 For an extended discussion see Priel, supra note 9. 
90 LEITER, supra note 88, at 34. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 35 n.96.  
94 In some of his writings Leiter seems to at least allow for the possibility of S-naturalism as a possible 
foundation for jurisprudence. See id. at 39-40, but more recently he rejected it as a possible foundation for 
jurisprudence and stated that jurisprudence should be limited only to methodological naturalism. See Brian 
Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: ree Approaches, in THE FUTURE OF NATURALISM 197, 197-99 (John R. 
Shook & Paul Kurtz eds., 2009). 
25 
 
 
 
 
I think M-Naturalism as distinct from and prior to S-naturalism is either uninteresting or 
false. Let us begin with methods continuity, the narrowest form of naturalism in Leiter’s 
classication, and see what it amounts to. &e idea here seems to be that only what counts as good 
ways of generating (what we take to be) true scientic propositions should be used in philosophy. 
Leiter does not elaborate on those methods, but presumably he thinks about the formation of 
theories based on drawing inferences only if they follow logically from the data or if they are 
supported by statistically signicant evidence. A scientic result is not considered valid until it is 
replicated, and a putative theory is not considered scientic if it is not testable and refutable.  
By these standards, however, virtually all “analytic” philosophers are M-naturalists. 
Philosophers present theses in which clearly dened premises are meant to lead to conclusions 
that are thought to follow from them. A philosophical thesis, much like a scientic theory, is 
refuted by presenting counter-examples to it, which lead either to renement of the theory or to 
its abandonment. In other cases a philosophical thesis can be refuted on purely logical grounds, 
e.g. by showing that its premises are contradictory, that its premises do not entail its alleged 
conclusion, or that it rests on a logical fallacy. Whenever a philosopher presents an argument she 
o"ers it to fellow philosophers for “testing” and “replication” in philosophy departments’ seminar 
rooms. In this respect legal philosophers are no di"erent from the rest of the philosophical crowd: 
when Hart or Raz argued that sanctions are not a necessary element of a legal system they did it by 
o"ering a counterexample of an imaginary case of something that we would think of as a legal 
system even though it contained no sanctions. If anything, analytic legal philosophy is even more 
committed to scientic method in this narrow sense that the rest of analytic philosophy as the 
mainstream view among analytic legal philosophers is that the primary task of jurisprudence is to 
provide a general account of the “nature” of law by trying to identify its necessary features in a 
manner not unlike that of a scientist trying to identify the chemical elements that necessarily 
make up, say, water.95  
So this is not a very interesting claim. Leiter argues that philosophers can (and should be) also 
M-naturalists in the sense that their views be supported by the results of science. Again Leiter 
provides little explanation as to what he means by “supported” but at one point he o"ers an 
example: “A philosophical account of morality that explains its nature and function in ways that 
would be impossible according to evolutionary theory would not, by naturalistic scruples, be an 
acceptable philosophical theory.”96 I cannot see how any philosopher, naturalistic or not, could 
argue with that. I take it as trivial that philosophers should advance theses that are consistent with 
                                                                
95 For more on this analogy see Dan Priel, e Scienti?c Model of Jurisprudence, in NEUTRALITY AND THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1515647. 
96 Brian Leiter, Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence, in ANALYZING LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY 79, 82 (Brian Bix ed., 1998). 
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true scientic theories, simply because their theses should be true. If proposition P contradicts 
proposition Q, and we know that Q is true, then P is necessarily false, and it does not matter 
whether one proposition is “scientic” and the other “philosophical.” So in this sense M-
naturalism is obvious. Indeed, in this respect the focus in Leiter’s denition on the natural sciences 
is possibly too narrow. Philosophical theses cannot be true if they contradict any true facts, 
including social facts, and given legal philosophy’s subject-matter it is much more likely that if it 
contradicts any true fact, it would be a social fact, not a fact discovered by one of the natural 
sciences. Whether there are social facts that cannot be reduced to natural facts is, of course, a 
controversial question, but if we only subscribe to M-naturalism, we cannot assume that all social 
facts are reducible to natural facts, for that is a controversial substantive thesis.97 In this sense the 
claim of M-naturalism is obvious and no philosopher, naturalistic or otherwise, should deny it.  
What is at stake in the question under discussion is the extent to which facts about the world, 
for example facts about evolutionary theory, are relevant to jurisprudence. &e real issue turns on 
the claim that some arguments could be true or false regardless of what the world turns out to be, 
and this presumably is where many contemporary legal positivists would situate their arguments.98 
&ey can then happily accept the constraints of M-naturalism and maintain that they can go on 
doing more-or-less what they have been doing all along, because the results of science, whatever 
they may be, do not aAect their inquiries.  
Here is where the metaphysical positivism of the classical positivists comes to the fore: it is the 
claim that the domain of “philosophical” questions about law whose truth does not depend on 
premises on what the world is like does not exist. is, however, is not a methodological claim but 
a substantive one. On this view there is no purely “philosophical” argument, because there is no 
pure “philosophical” domain. Slightly more weakly, it might be argued that no important 
questions about law belong to that domain. Both claims, however, are rmly committed to a 
version of S-naturalism. &ese are claims about the metaphysics of social facts, of law, or both. It 
is, in essence, a combination of the claim that legal positivism must be a metaphysically deep 
doctrine and that naturalism (metaphysical positivism) provides the most accurate metaphysical 
account. Contrary to Leiter, then, naturalism is rst a substantive view, not a methodological one. 
                                                                
97 See, e.g., J.A. Fodor, Special Sciences (or: Science as a Working Hypothesis), 28 SYNTHESE 97 (1974); Frank 
Jackson & Philip Pettit, In Defence of Explanatory Ecumenism, in MIND, MORALITY, AND EXPLANATION: 
SELECTED COLLABORATIONS 163 (2004). 
98 For views that (implicitly) adopt exactly this view see, for example, RAZ, supra note 71, at 159-60; 
SHAPIRO, supra note 72, at 406-07 n.16; John Gardner, Law’s Aims in Law’s Empire, in EXPLORING LAW’S 
EMPIRE 207, 208 (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006). All these authors (and incidentally, all contemporary legal 
positivists) invoke otherworldly examples in support of their claims about the nature of law.  
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Legal philosophers should care about the natural sciences only if the world (nature, human 
nature) happens to be one way and not another.  
Going back to the debates in jurisprudence that have been the subject of this essay, what 
emerges from this argument is that to the extent that classical legal positivism and contemporary 
legal positivism are on di"erent sides on the question of naturalism, they cannot be easily 
accommodated even at the level of methodology. More specically, the potential for 
accommodating naturalism with any particular version of contemporary legal positivism seems 
suspect.  
 (b) Classical Legal Positivism and the Internal Point of View 
&e last section was rather abstract. &is section continues with the same theme but does so by 
considering one specic issue, the “internal point of view.” &e standard positivist interpretation 
of the development of legal positivism from Hobbes to Hart locates the error of the classical legal 
positivists in their adoption of the external point of view in trying to explain the nature of law. 
&e result, according to this story, is the adoption of some version of a command theory of law 
according to which legal obligation depends only on the threat of sanction. Contemporary legal 
positivism corrected this error by emphasizing the fact that law is o*en taken by people to provide 
them with reasons for actions, a fact that command theories fail to take into account.  
My argument above purported to show that it is wrong to locate the tension between classical 
and contemporary legal positivism here. Nonetheless, in one sense this claim is not entirely 
mistaken: a direct implication of my argument is that classical legal positivists were not concerned 
with identifying or describing legal validity. &is claim has an interesting corollary in the context 
of the internal point of view. As Hart put it, the external perspective “may very nearly reproduce 
the way in which the rules function in the lives of certain members of the group, namely those 
who reject its rules”, but ignores those for whom “the violation of a rule is not merely a basis for 
the prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but a reason for hostility.”99 Although Hart did 
not distinguish clearly between them, hart’s discussion of the internal point of view contains both 
a substantive claim about the existence-conditions of law and a methodological claim about the 
correct way to address the fundamental questions of jurisprudence. &e substantive thesis is 
simply the other side of the view that makes legal validity the fundamental concept of 
jurisprudence. &e methodological thesis addresses the correct way of explaining human action 
and in particular the claim that the methods of science—exactly the methods on which Hobbes 
and Bentham tried to base their theories—are incapable of explaining certain forms of human 
behavior, including the institutions of law.  
                                                                
99 HART, supra note 8, at 90 (rst emphasis added).  
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Why classical legal positivists reject the substantive claim should by now be obvious. Does 
disentangling the two senses of the internal point of view leave it open for classical legal positivists 
to accept the methodological internal point of view? &ere is a view that does exactly that: these 
days it usually goes by the name “natural law.” A staple of most versions of natural law is exactly 
the rejection of the naturalist methodology of the classical legal positivists. Second, what may have 
been part of the motivation for the rejection of naturalistic methodology in the days of Hart is no 
longer a valid consideration. At least in part the motivation for rejecting naturalistic methodology 
was the view that it cannot give an adequate account of reason-based activity. No doubt some of 
Hobbes and Bentham’s attempts at human psychology look crude by today’s standards, because of 
the state of science of their day. &e unavailability of adequate scientic methods for investigating 
human reasoning may have been true as late as the time Hart wrote e Concept of Law. But this 
attitude is much less convincing these days when much of cognitive psychology is concerned 
exactly with explaining reason-based behavior.100 In fact, one of the most accepted ndings in 
cognitive psychology is that reports based on introspection by those engaged in normative activity 
(what legal philosophers call their “self-understanding”) are o*en inaccurate, self-serving, or are 
a*er-the-fact rationalizations.   
&e only way to vindicate looking at those self-understandings in the introspective fashion 
favored by proponents of the internal point of view is if the attitudes revealed by this methods are 
themselves are the object of inquiry. Contemporary legal positivism may be understood as an 
attempt to provide an account of those. But if that is the case, we see once again, albeit via a 
di"erent route, the di"erence between the questions that contemporary and classical legal 
positivists have been interested in.  
 (c) What’s in a Name? 
If this is true, if indeed contemporary legal positivism and classical legal positivism are such 
radically di"erent ideas, does it make sense to speak of both as “legal positivism”? One way of 
explaining why it might make sense is by linguistically distinguishing two senses of “positivism.” 
Contemporary legal positivists nd the label “positivism” apposite because it insists that all law is 
posited, or laid down. John Gardner asks, for example, “What should a ‘legal positivist’ believe if 
not that laws are posited?”101 Similarly, when Joseph Raz speaks of “positivistic standards” as the 
                                                                
100 Cf. Dan Priel, Jurisprudence and Psychology, in NEW WAVES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 77 (Maksymilian 
Del Mar ed., 2011). 
101 Gardner, supra note 11, at 200. For a more detailed, but in my view unsuccessful, attempt to defend this 
view see John Gardner, Some Types of Law, in COMMON LAW THEORY 51 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2008).  
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only legal standards what he has in mind are posited standards.102 By contrast the classical legal 
positivists, none of whom ever used the word “positivism” or “positivist,” may be thought to be 
positivists primarily because their views on law derive from a comprehensive 
methodological/metaphysical picture that could be called positivistic, a particular view about 
what the world is and a corresponding view about what this implies about the appropriate 
methods for investigating it. &e classical legal positivists are, if you wish, metaphysical positivists 
who worked out the implications of their positivism to law.  
&is, however, only makes the di"erence between the two versions of legal positivism even 
more profound. Even if we keep these two senses apart as I did here, by carefully distinguishing 
between the “classical” and the “contemporary,” is it not misleading to use a similar term to 
describe both and to suggest thereby the existence of some kind of link where none exists? In a 
sense this is merely a terminological question, for as long as we are clear about the di"erences 
between what I called classical and contemporary legal positivism, the names do not matter much. 
But, especially since the term “legal positivism” did not exist in Hobbes or Bentham’s days and 
they never used it to describe their views, would it not be more protable to stop using the term 
when talking about their views? Perhaps. It is important for me to stress that I am not here 
concerned with defending some “canonical” version of legal positivism as the “real” version of legal 
positivism. Ideas can be demarcated in di"erent ways which may be useful (or “correct”) for 
di"erent purposes. I also do not have any strong attachment to the label “legal positivism” and 
even less so to the views currently defended under it. Since on certain important issues I believe 
Hobbes and Bentham had the better view, it might be preferable (at least for someone like me) to 
try and dissociate such views from those defended by contemporary legal positivists.  
&ere are, however, at least three reasons why, with all the points just made borne in mind, 
using the term “legal positivism” may be useful for describing the work of Hobbes and Bentham. 
First, there may be value in keeping the label that highlights the historical path that leads from 
Hobbes or Bentham to Hart or Raz. It is a meandering route, in which quite o*en later theorists 
misunderstood, misapplied, or explicitly changed the ideas of their predecessors. Consequently the 
juxtaposition of di"erent “legal positivists” at both ends of this historical path can result in some 
truly odd couples. But to a story in the development of ideas, there may be value in seeing what 
Austin took from Bentham, what Hart took from Austin, and what Raz took from Hart, and 
more generally how one theoretical position could, eventually, beget a view that is in some respects 
diametrically opposed to it. Second, even though the term “positivism” was only coined by 
Auguste Comte in the middle of the nineteenth century, similar ideas have been around for much 
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(rev. ed. 1995); see also Hans Kelsen, On the Pure eory of Law, 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 1, 2 (1966) (“In order to be 
‘positive’ a legal norm … must be ‘posited’….”). 
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longer. Using the term “legal positivism” to describe some of Hobbes or Bentham’s ideas may be 
useful in highlighting the fact that they were (contrary to most contemporary legal positivists) 
metaphysical positivists, and in this way to highlight the connections between their ideas and 
broader changes in the intellectual landscape of Western thought. Finally, and most importantly, 
there is one doctrine that many (not all) legal positivists, classical and contemporary, share, and 
that is a non-moral account of law’s normativity. As I argued above, it is by looking at this issue 
that we can see the shi* from a focus on normativity to a focus on validity and with it the point at 
which contemporary legal positivism has nally cut its ties with classical legal positivism. No 
doubt that story can be told without calling these two views “legal positivism,” but the similar 
term highlights the jurisprudential connections that do exist between these positions.  
Conclusion: Towards Classical Legal Positivism 
&e successes of the scientic method put enormous pressure on other methods of inquiry. 
Philosophers in particular may have felt a need to justify their methods when many questions that 
used to belong to philosophy were subjected to scientic takeover. &e response adopted by Hart 
and some of his contemporaries was to turn philosophy into a subject concerned with questions 
that science could not possibly touch. (Tellingly, a rather similar move is discernable in religion.) 
&e adoption of the internal point of view was part of the same move. It insulated (or seemed to 
insulate) legal philosophy from the potential encroachment of science by delineating certain 
questions, and by implication the domain of legal philosophy, as a separate from that of science. 
But this “internalist” approach to legal philosophy has proven destructive for the subject. &e 
insistence that legal philosophy is concerned with conceptual questions pursued for their own 
sake, that concern with the practical signicance of jurisprudential debates is “fundamentally anti-
philosophical,”103 succeeded to secure the subject from intrusion from without only by killing it 
from within.  
Unfortunately this is now in many circles the dominant view about the proper domain of 
jurisprudence, so much so that it is sometimes suggested that this is the only way of doing proper, 
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“analytic” legal philosophy. &ere is, however, a di"erent response to the challenge posed by 
science, namely embracing it, and it is the one that Hobbes and Bentham adopted. In mentioning 
them I am not simply appealing to the authority of great dead philosophers. I would like to think 
that I would have thought this approach worth pursuing even had Hobbes and Bentham not 
existed. But it is worth demonstrating just how far the contemporary positivist approach is from 
the ideas of those usually considered, by contemporary legal positivists themselves, as founders of 
legal positivism. 
Ironically, the turn to science could open up the eld for what we might call more genuinely 
“philosophical” questions. Instead of trying to answer the fundamentally sociological question 
“what is law?,” legal philosophers could turn their attention to questions like “given particular 
physics and metaphysics, what laws can (and cannot) be?,” or to the kind of “Kantian” 
philosophical puzzle, “what makes law (legal obligation, legal authority, legal normativity) 
possible?,” or to a question like “given certain facts about nature (including human nature) what 
should laws be?” &ough such questions will presumably depend on facts about human nature, 
they are not sociological questions and an answer to them does not depend on people’s attitudes 
on the matter.104 &is is what I take to have been the essence of classical legal positivism. Had this 
approach to legal philosophy been taken more seriously the views that go by the name “legal 
positivism” would have looked quite di"erent from what they actually look like these days, no 
doubt more interesting, and probably more plausible. 
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